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DETECTION OVERVIEW

UnPAC-the-Hash Activity

Risk Factors

To successfully perform the UnPAC-the-Hash technique, an Active Directory (AD) environment must have implemented AD Certificate Services (AD CS) and Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication (PKINIT). Attack tools that perform this technique are publicly available, but an attacker must be familiar with the Kerberos protocol and AD. A successful exploit can lead to stolen credentials and further attacks on your network.

Category

Exploitation
Detection diagram
Next in Exploitation: Unusual Email Domain Length

Attack Background

Kerberos is an authentication protocol that issues tickets as cryptographic proof of identity. As an alternative to Kerberos, users can pre-authenticate with PKINIT. The Microsoft implementation of PKINIT, also referred to as PKCA, allows the usage of x.509 certificates. An attacker that pre-authenticated with PKINIT can perform the UnPAC-the-Hash technique to steal NTLM hashes of account passwords.

To steal NTLM hashes, the attacker must first acquire an x.509 certificate from AD CS and a valid ticket granting ticket (TGT) from the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) on a domain controller (DC). Next, the attacker can run an attack tool, such as Certipy or Rubeus, to send a specially designed Kerberos request (TGS_REQ) to the KDC (1). This request has an option bitmask, such as 0x40810018, that specifies a type of user-to-user authentication. The KDC responds with a ticket that contains an NTLM hash for a Service Principal Name (SPN). Specifically, the NTLM hash is inserted into the privilege attribute certificate (PAC) structure of the Kerberos ticket (2). The attacker can decrypt this ticket to steal the NTLM hash and perform additional attacks, such as pass-the-hash, to access services and devices.

Mitigation Options

Restrict or disable NTLM authentication and enable more secure protocols for authentication, such as Kerberos
Ensure that certificate authorities (CA) are properly secured
Ensure that certificates and associated private keys are properly secured

MITRE ATT&CK ID

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